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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the trade credit practices of manufacturing 
firms in the United States with special reference to the factors or de­
terminants influencing the granting of trade credit, the manner in which 
firms approach the trade credit decision, and the exogenous influence of 
monetary policy on the trade credit decision. 
Chapters II and III contain an examination of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on trade credit. Although the volume of trade credit 
literature is currently rather small, interest in this subject has grown 
in the last decade, primarily because of a renewed interest in the ef­
fects and the effectiveness of monetary policy. The main thrust of the 
literature, therefore, has been to specify the interrelationship between 
monetary policy and trade credit and to estimate the impact of trade 
credit on the alleged differential effects of monetary policy. 
A formal model of the workings of the trade credit mechanism is pre­
sented in Chapter IV, In specifying the model, attention has been given 
to the following questions: (1) What are the factors influencing the 
level of trade credit granted by firms? (2) How does monetary policy 
influence the granting of trade credit? (3) Does the evidence support 
the view that monetary policy discriminates against smaller firms? 
(4) Does the evidence support the view that monetary policy is made more 
general in effect by credit reallocation from the larger firms to the 
smaller firms through the trade credit mechanism? 
The results obtained from empirically testing the model are presented 
in Chapter V. Chapter VI contains a summary of the work and the conclusions 
drawn from it. 
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CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
Most of the literature on trade credit is concerned with its rela­
tionship to monetary policy. The issue is whether trade credit can, by 
releasing funds for other uses, and thus increasing the velocity of the 
existing stock of money, act as a deterrent to monetary policy. The 
question is a modern day outgrowth of an issue that was debated as far 
back as the early nineteenth century, ,. 
Many of the earlier thoughts on credit theory in general were con­
cerned with the determination of the price level. Discussion centered 
around how credit affected the quantity theory of money. Two viewpoints 
arose, the "currency" view and the "banking school" view. Proponents of 
the former included David Ricardo and Robert Torrens, who were of the 
opinion that the price level was determined only by the supply of money. 
Credit, being limited by the money supply itself, exerted no influence on 
the price level. John Stuart Mill argued the "banking school" theory. 
This theory took the position that money was simply another form of 
credit. Prices did not depend upon money but upon purchases. Since 
credit could be used for purchases in the same manner as money, it there­
fore influenced prices. Credit was a substitute for money (Levitt, 1964}. 
Years later, the Radcliff Committee was to echo this sentiment. Con­
sequently, they argued that monetary policy should seek to control not 
only the money supply but the econony's entire stock of liquidity. The 
Radcliff stand was widely opposed. Opponents argued that credit repre­
sents a transfer of, rather than an addition to, total liquidity. 
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Reduction of the money supply, they claimed, becomes general as It cre­
ates a diffuse difficulty of borrowing. The issue remains an empirical 
question (Levitt, 1964). 
This study is aimed In part at analyzing the role that trade credit 
has in influencing the levels of economic activity. Historically, the 
theoretical views have been confusing, but an examination of some of the 
earlier writings will facilitate an understanding of how trade credit 
can affect economic activity, 
John Stuart Mill's position on the effects of trade credit on the 
econony is clear. A loan of cash from one firm to another is a mere 
transfer of purchasing power. But the manner in which the loan is 
utilized may cause an increase in purchasing power. Mill seemed to be 
hinting at utilization of idle balances and thus an increase of velocity. 
For credit. Mill used a closed circuit of dealings between firms. Trade 
credit is an added store of liquidity that can be used as purchasing power. 
...one single exertion of the credit power in the form of book 
credit is only the foundation of a single purchase: but if a 
bill is drawn, that same portion of credit may serve for as many 
purchases as the number of times the bill changes hands, while 
every bank note Issued renders the credit of the banker a pur­
chasing power to that amount in the hands of all the successive 
holders without Impairing any power they may possess of ef­
fecting purchases on their own credit. Credit, in short, has 
exactly the same purchasing power with money; and as money tells 
upon prices not simply in proportion to its amount, but its 
amount multiplied by the number of times it changes hands, so 
also does credit; and credit transferable from hand to hand is 
in that proportion more potent than credit which only performs 
one purchase (Mill, 1929, p. 532). 
Note that for major Impact, credit must be negotiable. This is not a 
feature of most book credit issued today. Thus, if credit is not a direct 
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substitute for money, velocity becomes the important factor for determin­
ing the total Impact of trade credit, 
Irving Fisher viewed trade credit as a means of financing transac­
tions with a lower stock of money. Trade credit did not replace the use 
of money, but only postpone its use. As the credit became due, money 
must be paid in the same manner as though cash had originally been spent. 
Thus, the economic impact of trade credit was the result of net in­
creases in trade credit, that is, the difference between credit granted 
and credit paid off. This effect can be seen in the Fisherian treatment 
of trade credit in the equation of exchange. It is treated as a one 
time occurrence: 
MV + M«V« + E«« - E*»« = pq (Fisher, 1929, pp. 370-71)= (2-.1) 
where M refers to cash, M' to bank deposits, V and V their respective 
velocities, E" is new credit given and E'" is credit repaid. 
Levitt (1964) wrongly interpreted Fisher to mean that gross trade 
credit was not important. He cited R. S. Sayers in disagreeing with the 
Fisherian approach. The disagreement, however, can be easily reconciled. 
Levitt and Sayers appear to have confused the macroeconomic netting 
procedure with a microeconomic netting procedure. When Fisher refers 
to a net increase in trade credit, he is referring to net increases in 
the total gross credit outstanding in the entire economy. Fisher's net 
increase or decrease in trade credit is simply new gross trade credit 
minus paid off gross trade credit for the econony. Sayers' contention 
that gross trade credit at the firm level is significant is well taken. 
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It represents purchasing power for the firm. Taken at the macroeconomic 
level, this is fully consistent with Fisher's equation. Sayers says: 
An entire closed circle of firms in manufacturing industry 
may begin giving credit more freely, and all of them proceed 
to place large orders with each other; there is no doubt about 
the increase in effective demand, although the increase in credit 
granted by all the firms together is balanced by the increase 
in credit taken by all the firms together. No one would serious­
ly suggest that bank credit should be 'netted out' by deducting 
the debts people owe to the banks, ....(Sayers, 1960, p. 713), 
This was exactly what Fisher had stated. What occurs in Sayers' closed 
circle is that more credit in the gross sense has been created than re­
paid. Hence E"- E'*' Increases and shows an economic impact on pq, or 
aggregate economic activity. The disagreement is semantic. Sayers views 
net credit as accounts receivable minus accounts payable, which is ap­
propriate in a microeconomic framework. Fisher views net credit as new 
accounts receivable minus accounts receivable paid off, which is an ap­
propriate measure of impact on the economy. 
Since the present study will incorporate an analysis of both gross 
trade credit and net trade credit in examining the relationship between 
trade credit and economic activity, it is important that an understanding 
of the terms be gained before proceeding. Furthermore, it is necessary 
to have a theoretical understanding of how the trade credit mechanism 
functions. As will be noted below, the impact of trade credit on economic 
activity is based upon its ability to affect the velocity of the existing 
stock of money, 
Brechling and Lipsey (1963) have categorized and presented compactly 
the various theories of trade credit. They are divided into gross trade 
credit theories and net trade credit theories, where net trade credit 
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for the individual firm is defined as total trade receivables minus total 
trade payables. Some of the theories presented by Brechling and Lipsey 
are inapplicable because they assume that trade credit is conducted 
through negotiable instruments. Only the theories that are applicable 
to the present study will be examined. 
The first of these theories assumes non-transferability of credit 
issues and a fixed credit period. It argues that increases in gross 
trade credit alone can create additional demand. This is the argument 
presented by Sayers above. Brechling and Lipsey argue that this theory 
is of little consequence. The immediate result, they maintain, is to 
merely increase velocity; more transactions are conducted with the same 
quantity of active money. The increased velocity does create an impact, 
but only for the period for which the credit is granted. At the end of 
the credit period cash must flow for payment: 
If there were no trade credit, a rise in production and sales 
would entail an immediate rise in money flows; with trade 
credit the rise in money flows is postponed for the period of 
the credit, but it then rises just as if there had been no trade 
credit, so that the problem of financing the increased money 
flows asserts itself in exactly the same way as if there had 
been no credit (Brechling and Lipsey, 1963, p. 623). 
Thus, the ability of trade credit to increase the velocity of a given 
stock of money is limited to the period of the credit, if the credit 
period is fixed. Modification of the credit period leads to another 
gross credit theory. 
If firms do not collect the credit due at the end of the trade 
credit period, but rather extend the period, the analysis is changed 
significantly. General extension of the trade credit period means 
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that firms may reduce their overall cash flows between firms. 
This creates an added fund from which income creating payments 
can be financed. The cash is freed only so long as the flows between 
firms are reduced. Effectively, the result is an increase in the velocity 
of the money stock. 
The amount of cash that can be freed in this manner is related to 
the proportion of weekly sales that is held in precautionary balances. 
Let be the extension of the credit period in weeks, £ be the proportion 
of weekly purchases covered by precautionary balances, x be the required 
cash payments as a proportion of weekly purchases and ^  be the time 
measured in weeks. The time for which the added cash can be made available 
is: 
t = I E^ . (2.2) 
Thus, if the period of credit is steadily rising in a period of monetary 
tightness, it is quite possible that at least some portion of monetary 
policy is being frustrated. Brechling and Lipsey insert what they term 
"plausible" values to show the possible offset of monetary policy effects 
for up to six months. 
The net trade credit theories all possess similarities that, in 
practice, may make it impossible to determine which, if any, is in opera-
tion._ The first theory assumes that some firms have idle balances which 
they are willing to decrease. They do this by increasing trade credit 
given without Increasing trade credit taken. An identical result arises 
in the second theory which hypothesizes that weak firms must Increase 
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trade credit given but are unable to pressure other firms into giving 
them added trade credit. The third net trade credit theory supposes 
that firms do not have idle balances to run down. But they respond to 
increases in trade credit given by taking added trade credit only after 
a time lag. Cash flows are offset for the period of the lag. 
The net trade credit theories require that idle cash be put to 
active use, increasing the velocity of money, Brechling and Lipsey 
accept all of the net theories as plausible. They state that the net 
trade credit mechanism, at least theoretically, is capable of frustrating 
monetary policy for a significant time. It remains an empirical question 
whether such offsets occur. 
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CHAPTER III; EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW 
At this point, attention is focused on the empirical studies con­
cerning trade credit. Only a few such studies have been published. 
Some of these will be examined in detail because they provide the basic 
background and framework upon which this study is based. Particular 
aspects of the models associated with the previous studies will be 
adopted; other aspects will be challenged and discarded. The issues— 
the relationship of trade credit and monetary policy, the reallocation 
of credit through the trade credit mechanism, and the formal behavioral 
model of the trade credit decision—will, in general, remain the same. 
Empirical studies of trade credit fall into two general categories; 
those testing the ability of trade credit to offset monetary policy and 
those testing the ability of trade credit to bring about a more general 
monetary policy from its initial differential effects. In most of these 
studies, the determinants of trade credit are hypothesized without an 
extensive theoretical framework. 
Brechling and Lipsey (1963) formulated their behavioral equations 
into trade credit given and trade credit taken;^  
TCg^  = G(S^ , M, e.) (3.1) 
TCt. = T(P., M, u^ ) (3.2) 
N^otation used throughout is altered for consistency in the paper 
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where TC is trade credit given by firm i, TC^ . is trade credit taken by 
- —Li 
firm_1, G and T are functional notations, £ is sales, P is purchases, 
M is an indicator of the strength of monetary policy, and and Uj^  are 
error terms. The multiple regression technique for testing was rejected 
on the grounds that it is not easy to get a good "quantitative estimate 
of the relative strength of monetary policy for a ten year period" 
(Brechling and Lipsey, 1963, p. 629). The approach adopted was to re­
gress trade credit given and taken against sales and purchases respec­
tively and then observe the behavior of the error terms over time. 
A sample of the sales data for 75 firms was taken. These firms had 
combined sales of over four billion pounds sterling, with an aggregate 
income-sales ratio of 27%. The firms accounted for approximately 5.4% 
of the national income of the United Kingdom. Annual data were taken 
from the ten year period of July 1950 to June 1959. The initial simple 
regressions tested were: 
TCg^  = ai + biSi + gi (3.3) 
TCt^  = Ci + diPi + ti (3.4) 
where aj and ^ i are intercepts, and ^  are the residuals. These re-
2 gressions were computed for each of the 75 firms, yielding a mean R of 
.81 and .69 respectively. This suggested that the level of turnover was 
the predominant determinant of trade credit, as expected. 
The residuals,and were then treated as abnormal trade credit. 
They were summed over the 75 firms and plotted over time. The plots 
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were compared to four indicators of monetary policy over time; consol 
yield, the bill rate, the ratio of money to gross national product (the 
income velocity of money) and the ratio of bank advances to gross national 
product (the income velocity of bank advances). All of the indicators 
were adjusted for time trend. The comparisons clearly showed a con­
siderable increase in both abnormal trade credit given and taken during 
periods of tight money. 
Abnormal trade credit was then framed into gross and net credit 
given to determine the passing-on of credit. Gross credit is increased 
by giving more or taking less credit. Conversely, it is decreased by 
giving less and taking more credit. Abnormal gross credit given and taken 
is formulated by: 
Abnormal gross credit given = g^  + (tT) (3.5) 
Abnormal gross credit taken = t^  + (g^ ) (3.6) 
where t~ is any decrease in abnormal credit taken and g£ is any decrease 
in abnormal credit given. Net abnormal trade credit is the difference be­
tween abnormal trade credit given and taken: 
Net abnormal trade credit = g^  - t^  (3.7) 
Credit passed on is credit that is both given and taken by the same firm. 
For an individual firm, it is the smaller of trade credit given or trade 
credit taken. In the aggregate, passing on is the difference between 
gross and net credit. Brechling and Lipsey formulated the aggregates as 
follow: 
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Aggregate gross credit given = Zgt + 2 jt^  ^| 
Aggregate gross credit taken = Ztt + 2 |gj^   
Aggregate net credit given = n"^  = 2n+ = 
Aggregate net credit taken = n~ = Zn? = ZCg^ -t^ )" 
(3.8) 
(3.10) 
(3.9) 
(3.11) 
where the minus superscripts indicate decreases and the pluses indicate 
increases. The study indicated that about 40% of gross credit movements 
were accounted for by passing on. 
The final step in the Brechling and Lipsey paper was to evaluate 
the inflationary and/or deflationary impact of abnormal net trade credit. 
Inflationary Impact was alleged when the increase in net trade credit 
given was not offset by decreases in inventories, or when the increase 
in net trade taken was not offset by increases in money balances or 
financial securities. The inflationary net trade credit was then com­
pared with other financial flows to attain a measure of the relative im­
portance of trade credit as an inflationary force. Of the 75 firms in 
the sample, only 30 published income-sales ratios, which were taken as 
representative of the whole economy. The sales of the firm multiplied 
by the income-sales ratio was taken as the income generated by the firm. 
The abnormal inflationary trade credit as a percent of income generated 
was then extended to the whole economy. The inflationary effect of trade 
credit was found to be a significant frustrator of monetary policy. 
The findings of this study were seriously challenged by White 
(1964) on the grounds of statistical and conceptual errors that led to 
heavy exaggeration of the inflationary effects. White maintained that 
the data given supported the conclusion that the expansion of trade 
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credit provided a very weak offset to monetary policy. White presented 
a list of objections, some well taken, others questionable. Only two of 
the major points will be presented here. 
The first objection was that the Brechling and Lipsey study compared 
inflationary net trade credit against the increase in bank advances in 
the year rather than against the difference in bank advances in a normal 
year minus the advances in a tight money year. Thus the relative impact 
of inflationary trade credit was overstated. Secondly, White attacks 
the comparison of flows of bank credits with stocks of inflationary trade 
credit outstanding. What should have been used for comparison is the 
change in inflationary net trade credit from one year to the next; that 
is, first differences. Had this been done, the procedure would have 
shown that trade credit not only did not offset but served to reinforce 
monetary policy. In the absence of actual empirical figures by White, the 
last comment may be an overstatement. The criticism, however, is in the 
spirit of the reconciliation of Fisher and Sayers presented in Chapter II, 
In all, White presented a critique that substantially reduced the impact 
of the Brechling and Lipsey empirical results. He did not intend to at­
tack the basic theoretical construct of the study. Rather, he attacked 
their Interpretation of the empirical results. 
The questionable nature of the Brechling and Lipsey study was en­
larged by a study conducted by Coates (1967). Coates examined the ac­
counts of 50 of the larger companies in the British Board of Trade statis­
tics for the period 1956-63. He tested the hypothesis that trade credit 
is expanded to abnormal levels during periods of tight money, and that 
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this credit is most likely to originate in firms with strong short term 
financial positions. The method of analysis was to form ratios of trade 
credit to turnover, take the first differences over time and observe 
their behavior. This was done for aggregated data and for individual 
firms. First differences of this ratio were expected to show a rising 
pattern in periods of tight money if firms were increasing trade credit 
abnormally. No noticeable pattern emerged, however. 
Examination of the firms on an individual basis yielded no support 
for the hypothesis and found that only six of the fifty companies were 
able to expand their credit-turnover ratios by one percent or more during 
both of the tight money periods covered in the analysis. Furthermore, 
Coates examined the liquidity positions and working capital positions of 
the firms over the periods of monetary restraint and found that the 
majority of them evidently had the ability to expand their credit. A 
shortage of liquid assets was not associated with the credit squeeze. 
This finding suggested to Coates that in periods of tight money the pres­
sures for more trade credit were small or that the firms had objectives of 
a higher order pertaining to their liquidity positions. 
At least one comment is in order concerning Coates' analysis. His 
data do seem to support the position that trade credit does not expand 
sufficiently to act as a major offset to monetary policy for the entire 
econony. The study indicates, however, that monetary policy is not very 
effective in restraining large firms. Their liquidity and working capi­
tal positions remained strong. Sales continued to rise throughout both 
of the tight money periods and fell only after relaxation of tight money 
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in one period. The credit-turnover ratio fell in only one of the two 
periods. A strong possibility exists that these results hold only for 
large firms with strong credit lines such that their availability does 
not suffer in periods of restraint. If this is the case, it would give 
support to the argument that differential effects of monetary policy exist. 
The second type of empirical work that has been conducted involving 
trade credit is centered around the controversy of discriminatory or dif­
ferential effects of monetary policy. One of the primary interests of 
this paper will be to examine the trade credit mechanism to determine if 
any evidence of credit discrimination exists. Given evidence of dis­
criminatory effects, the next step will be to investigate how the trade 
credit mechanism reacts. The primary empirical work in this area was 
done by Meltzer (1960, 1963), which was in part a reply to Galbraith (1957). 
Galbraith argued that the impact of monetary policy is uneven to the 
extent that it discriminates against smaller, more competitive firms. 
This effect presumably occurs because credit rationing tends to favor 
larger, more stable firms, Meltzer argued that the differential effects 
of monetary policy are modified and become more general as the trade credit 
mechanism redistributes financial resources from the large to the small 
firms. Meltzer's studies are an important contribution to trade credit 
analysis. Consequently, a fairly thorough examination will be given here. 
Meltzer began by noting that during the tight money period of 1955-57 
the increase in trade credit was three times larger than the growth of 
the money supply. The extension of trade credit in this period seems 
to Tiave favored the firms that were supposedly discriminated against 
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by credit rationing. The analysis began with an examination of the re­
lationship between the liquidity position of firms of varying sizes and 
some measure of monetary tightness. 
The liquidity position was defined as; 
or the ratio of cash holdings plus holdings of government securities to 
current liabilities. The money market variable, or the indicator of 
monetary policy, was taken as; 
where ^  is the rate of interest on three month treasury bills and 
FR ^ is the ratio of free reserves to total reserves. 
Using seasonally adjusted quarterly data from the SEC-FTC Quarterly 
Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations, Meltzer then ran the 
following regression for firms in seven asset size groups; 
where u is the error term. The results showed a tendency for the marginal 
effect of M on LQto increase with firm size. The differences were not 
large except for the two smallest asset groups. Overall, while the money 
supply was increasing by only one billion dollars in the 1955-57 tight 
money period, the cash and government security holdings of all the firms 
decreased by five billion dollars. 
Meltzer then defined the net trade credit position (R) of firms as 
the net receivables to sales ratio; 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
LQ = a + bM + u (3.14) 
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(3.15) 
where £ is accounts and notes receivable, £ is accounts and notes payable 
and £ is sales. He then noted that tight money periods are likely to 
affect firms through decreased sales to customers who cannot maintain 
their inventory position. To offset this sales loss, firms may grant 
trade credit more freely and on easier terms. A second equation is then 
specified: 
This regression was tested for all seven asset sizes. The results showed 
that the groups with the largest dollar decline in liquid assets had 
the strongest negative relationships between liquidity and the net 
receivables-to-sales ratio. Only the two largest and one smaller asset 
size had a positive relationship between R and £, indicating that larger 
firms tended to be the principal lenders if credit reallocation takes 
place, 
Meltzer admitted several shortcomings of his work. The data did 
not allow separation of effects by type of industry or product classifica­
tion from effects of size. The aggregated form of the data made it diffi­
cult to infer the manner of decision making by individual firms. Finally , 
the data are for the manufacturing sector only. 
In his second paper on trade credit, Meltzer (1963) utilized the 
same approach but with different data. The data were selected in an at­
tempt to overcome some of the shortcomings noted in his earlier study. 
The data came from 86 firms selected in the following manner: 40 firms 
R = a + bj^ LQ + bgS + u (3,16) 
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came from Moody's where they reported quarterly balance sheets; the 
remaining 46 firms were based on a sample drawn from the Thomas Register. 
To get this latter group, 1372 firms were selected randomly and sent 
questionnaires in two mailings. There were 185 responses of which 46 
contained usable data. In this analysis, both regressions cited above 
were computed for each of the 86 firms in the sample. A new step in 
the analysis was added; the regression of net receivables against the 
monetary policy indicator. 
The results revealed that about two-thirds of the firms showed a 
positive relationship between R and M, and a negative relationship 
between 1^  and M, with about 60% of the results significant. By classi­
fying the results by asset size, industry and liquidity position, Meltzer 
found that the sign of the regression coefficient was related to size 
only. No significant difference was noted for classification by industry 
or liquidity position. The latter finding was contrary to the results 
of the first study, which used aggregate data. A high liquidity posi­
tion did not appear to serve as a good predictor of trade lending. An 
important result showed that smaller firms had a tendency to increase 
their liquidity and lower their net receivables-to-sales ratio in periods 
of monetary restraint. 
By interpreting the results of equation 3.16, Meltzer considered 
either bj^  less than zero or b^  greater than zero as evidence that a firm 
extends credit by increasing receivables. The results were not as con­
clusive as the previous regressions but generally supported the conclusions 
above. 
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As âi final step in his analysis, Meltzer classified the firms as 
"lenders", "strict non-lenders" and "others". Lenders were defined as 
those that displayed one of the following characteristics; 
(a) a significant relationship betweenJM and R that is greater 
than zero 
(b) a significant relationship between L and R that is less than 
zero 
(c) a significant relationship between ^  and R that is greater 
than zero, 
and neither of the other two relationships has the reverse sign. Strict 
non-lenders follow a reverse pattern. He found 25 lenders and 18 strict 
non-lenders; the remaining 43 firms were classified as "others". Com­
parison was then made of the mean and median changes in R and for 
all groups during the tight money period 1955 II to 1957 III. Three 
factors differentiated the lenders from the other groups. First, the 
mean change in R did not differ significantly from zero for non-lenders 
or others, but was clearly positive for lenders. Secondly, the mean 
change in R differed significantly from the mean change for non-lenders. 
Thirdly, all but one of the lenders increased R during the period, but 
only three of the non-lenders displayed this characteristic. Again, 
size of firm was the primary determinant that separated lenders from 
non-lenders. Comparisons made of the mean changes in liquidity positions 
between lenders and non-lenders displayed no significant difference. 
Meltzer's results led him to conclude that while the initial impact 
of monetary policy would seem to favor large, more liquid firms, the 
mechanism of trade credit promotes an overall general impact. Mayer 
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(1966) has suggested that this conclusion must be qualified by two con­
siderations. First, the cost of trade credit is much more expensive 
than the cost of bank loans, if one considers the implicit rate of in­
terest on trade credit.^  Second, since trade credit is a competitive 
weapon, it places smaller firms who find it harder to borrow at a com­
petitive disadvantage relative to large firms. These considerations, 
Mayer maintained, show that monetary policy still discriminates against 
small firms and gives a competitive benefit to larger firms. 
It is possible that Mayer's comments are considerably overstated. 
Note that many firms evidently utilize trade credit even when monetary 
policy is loose and funds freely available. Firms must therefore feel 
that trade credit possesses certain advantages despite the higher im­
plicit interest cost. Also, it is not established that firms generally 
consider the implicit cost as a cost at all. Mayer's second point over­
looks the ability of firms to pass on trade credit. As a matter of bal­
ance sheet arithmetic, the smaller firms conceivably could receive trade 
credit from larger firms, and pass it on to their customers, as trade or 
consumer credit, to support their sales. 
In the preceding papers, the determinants of trade credit have been 
formulated without a strong theoretical framework. That is, the deter­
minants have been suggested in an ad hoc manner. Nadiri (1969) has 
presented an analysis of trade credit that features an optimality model 
based on the theory of the firm. He examined the opportunity costs of 
F^or a discussion of the implicit cost of trade credit, see Weston 
and Brigham (1968, pp, 348-50). 
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extending and receiving trade credit in a model which treated trade 
credit as a selling expense analogous to advertising. 
The model was specified as follows. The quantity of sales is postu­
lated as a function of product price, the volume of trade credit, and 
monetary.policy; 
q = f(p, TC, M) (3.17) 
Cost is a function of production cost, c(q), and selling expense, D; 
C = c(q) + D (3.18) 
D is the sum of newly advanced trade credit, TC, and the replacement 
of trade credit lost due to bad debts or other reasons. The replacement 
component of D is JTC, with being the rate of depreciation of trade 
credit. To find the optimal product price, maximize: 
fj^ (p, TC, M) [pf(p, TC, M) - c(q) - D] dt (3.19) 
subject to the constraint; 
D = TC + jTC (3.20) 
Once the optimal price has been obtained, the optimal level of trade 
credit is obtained by maximizing: 
f2(TC, M) = [?f(TC, M) - (r W)TC]dt (3.21) 
The solution, taken from Nerlove and Arrow (1962), is: 
TC V (3.22) pq T^ ( r+J) 
where £ is the rate of discount and v and are elasticities of demand 
with respect to trade credit and price respectively. Nadirl concludes 
that in general: 
22 
TGt = g(pq, u, M) (3.23) 
where ££ is sales and ii is the user cost or opportunity cost of credit 
which equals r +/. 
From the above, Nadiri formulates the hypotheses that (a) trade 
credit is positively related to sales, (b) trade credit is negatively 
related to user cost and (c) the effect of monetary policy cannot be 
specified ^  priori "but depends upon how the demand and supply functions 
of trade credit shift, 
Nadiri then sets out to identify the user or opportunity cost of 
trade credit. Three components are selected: (s), the adjusted carrying 
cost of trade credit, ( é) the rate of depreciation on trade credit and 
(LQ) the liquidity position of the firm, which is a proxy for the 
ability of the lender to finance receivables. Thus; 
Carrying costs (s^ ) consist of interest foregone by tying up funds (r), 
adjusted for the normal capital gain or loss, and changes in the price 
level; 
The carrying cost is also influenced by the discount period of the 
trade credit, which affects the creditor's carrying cost. Thus must 
be adjusted to obtain £; 
u = s + / + LQ (3.24) 
(3.25) 
where r is the prime commercial rate.^  
N^adiri does not specify which prime rate he uses. 
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s - [ 1 - I"] Sj^  (3.26) 
where Jt is the discount period and T is the net period of credit. 
Finally, the depreciation rate of trade credit consists of two parts, 
the percent of bad debts and the delinquency rate on accounts outstanding. 
The equations tested by Nadiri were; 
Nadiri biased the results by searching for the most appropriate form 
for the estimating equations. They were; 
In(AR^ ) = aQ + a^ ln(S^ ) + aglnCut) + a^ dlnCM^ ) + a^ ln(AR^ _j^ ) (3.29) 
In(APt) = bg + b^ ln(P^ .) + bglnfu^ ) + bgdlnXM^ ) + b/^ on(AP|._2) (3.30) 
where £ is sales and P is purchases. Nadiri tested four different indi­
cators of monetary policy and found that tre rate of change of the money 
supply yielded the best results. 
Nadiri's results showed the elasticities of AR^  and AP», as given 
by the regression coefficients, with respect to £t and Pt respectively, 
to be substantially different. He interpreted this to mean that "A 
unit increase in manufacturing sales to other sectors seems to generate 
more trade credit that a unit increase in sales of other sectors to the 
manufacturing sector" (Nadiri, 1969, p. 416). AR^  was negatively re­
lated to u, as predicted, and the relationship was stronger than that of u 
and AP*:, suggesting that as the cost of credit rises, manufacturers seem 
to increase payables and reduce or postpone extending receivables. The 
ARt = gj^ (pq, u, M) (3.27) 
APt = g2(pq, u, M) (3.28) 
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dominant influence in the user cost element was liquidity. Re-estimating 
the equation using only liquidity for user costs, the coefficients be­
came larger and were significant in both equations. Thus liquidity ap­
peared to be an important determinant of trade credit. Nadirl pointed 
out that the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated some serial correlation 
in the residuals. The Durbin-Watson statistic, however, is generally 
unreliable when the lagged dependent variable is present in the equation 
(Wallis, 1969). 
To compare the results of his model with those of Meltzer, Nadiri 
reformulated the equations in terms of net trade credit: 
ln(ARj. - AP^ ) = % + a^ lnCS^ ) + a2ln(u^ ) + a^ dlnCM^ .) + 
a^ ln(AR^ ._j^  - (3.31) 
Nadiri found no strong evidence supporting the proposition that 
tighter money leads to an increase in net trade credit. Thus it would 
not add to inflationary pressure. Nadiri stated that his results differed 
from Meltzer's in two ways. First, he finds liquidity a significant de­
terminant of trade credit and second, he does not find that net trade 
credit increases during tight money periods. These statements, however, 
misinterpret Meltzer's findings. Recall that in his first paper, Meltzer, 
using data from the same source as Nadiri, also found liquidity to be a 
significant factor in the determination of trade credit. In the same 
paper, he found the net trade credit-to-sales ratios increasing only 
for the two largest groups and one smaller group by asset size as monetary 
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policy tightened. Nadiri's results are, therefore, not comparable to 
Meltzer's. In any case, Meltzer was more concerned with the realloca­
tion of credit than with the aggregate relationship between the volume 
of net trade credit and monetary policy. 
To make a comparison with Brechling and Lipsey, Nadiri ran the simple 
regression; 
ln(AR^  - APj.) = bg + bj^ ln(S^ ) + residuals. (3,32) 
The residuals were plotted and compared with monetary policy, Nadiri 
noted that during most of the period, a tighter monetary policy was as­
sociated with a contraction of net trade credit, contrary to the find­
ings of Brechling and Lipsey, using British data. 
Nadiri's final conclusions were that; (1) Trade credit can be 
treated as a selling expense. (2) Accounts receivable, accounts payable 
and net trade credit all respond to changes in user costs. The effects 
of monetary policy are felt through the liquidity element. (3) Gross 
trade credit granted or received responds positively to changes in monetary 
policy, but net trade credit is insensitive, (4) The equations of 
accounts receivable and accounts payable respond differently to the 
determinants and should be examined separately. Simply estimating net 
trade credit conceals some of the dynamic behavior of the accounts. 
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CHAPTER IV. A MODEL OF TRADE CREDIT DETERMINATION 
Comments on Previous Work 
The work done by Meltzer (1960, 1963) is probably the best and most 
complete study to date on trade credit. Still, several points arise. 
First, Meltzer utilized ordinary least squares to test a model which is, 
by its nature, a simultaneous-equation system. To avoid the possibility 
of simultaneous-equation bias, a simultaneous-equation estimation method, 
such as two-stage least-squares, should have been employed. 
Second, the formulation of the liquidity equation by Meltzer is an 
oversimplification. Although a good R^  is obtained by using one depend­
ent variable, namely monetary policy, the explanation of liquidity de­
termination for businesses must be regarded as incomplete. The use of 
one explanatory variable is suitable to Meltzer's goal of linking mone­
tary policy and trade credit; but a satisfactory answer to the issue de­
mands a more complete specification. 
Further, no sound justification is given by Meltzer for using an in­
terest rate adjusted by the ratio of free reserves to total reserves as 
the indicator of monetary policy. The interest rate would be expected 
to rise during periods of tight money and the normal expectation would be 
for the ratio of free reserves to total reserves to fall. Superficially, 
the adjustment would appear to be a smoothing process of two separate 
monetary policy indicators.^  This Indicator is not necessarily incorrect, 
H^ypothetically, use of interest rates of .02, .04 and .05 with ratios 
of .2, .1 and .05 respectively would yield identical levels of monetary 
policy. 
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but some justification should have been given for its use. Finally, 
the primary purpose of Meltzer's model was not trade credit determination. 
Its intent was to show that there exists a relationship between monetary 
policy and trade credit which compensates, at least in part, for the 
differential effects of monetary policy. A more formal statement of 
trade credit determination was left for others. This was what Nadiri 
attempted to provide. 
Nadiri's primary contribution lies in the introduction of trade credit 
as a decision variable in the firm's profit maximization scheme and in 
examining the opportunity costs of such credit. At this point, two 
criticisms of Nadiri's work can be made. The most serious shortcoming 
was the failure to test the model across data for all asset sizes avail­
able in the FTC-SEC Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing. Failure 
to do so makes some of his conclusions unjustifiable. Although the asset 
sizes themselves are aggregations, their use does add an extra dimension 
to the investigation that should not be overlooked. It is reasonable to 
expect that firms of different asset size differ in many other aspects 
as well, including the manner in which they conduct their trade credit 
operations. This is the essence of the Meltzer study. Thus, when Nadiri 
declared that net trade credit does not increase during tight money 
periods, he is unable to say anything about the reallocation of credit 
T^his paper will utilize the loan-to-deposit ratio as a measure of 
overall credit availability. Since a bank's loans outstanding, relative 
to the deposits it possesses, is an indication of the bank's ability 
to lend further, this seems an appropriate measure. 
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between firms. By examining net trade credit by asset sizes, information 
of this nature can be derived. Much of this information is obscured 
by aggregation. Consequently, Nadiri's challenge to Meltzer's results 
are not well founded, especially when considered in light of the fact 
that Meltzer obtained similar results using similar data. 
With respect to the elements of user cost, Nadiri found that only 
liquidity was a significant factor. On the basis of this finding, he de­
clared user costs to be a significant factor. The results do not fully 
substantiate this position. While it cannot be denied that liquidity 
could be treated as a user cost, a valid theoretical question remains as 
to how businesses view the relationship between liquidity and the grant­
ing of trade credit. That is, since liquidity is the only significant 
element of user cost, might not managers be viewing it in an altogether 
different perspective? This paper will maintain that this is the case 
and will present an alternative hypothesis of the determination of trade 
credit. 
Trade credit is granted to encourage or to maintain sales and thus 
to increase or to sustain profits. A question not easily answered is; 
What places constraints on the granting of trade credit, if anything? As 
long as credit-worthy customers exist and need trade credit to buy, the 
rational businessman would extend credit indefinitely in the absence 
of some constraints. Unless constraints exist, the decision to grant or 
not to grant trade credit would logically be a passive one. 
It is plausible to view the trade credit mechanism as functioning 
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within the wider scope of the firm's asset and Liability management. 
The trade credit decision, whether active or passive, must relate not 
only to the firm's profit and sales goals but to the firm's asset and 
liability portfolio as well. It is in the latter area that the con­
straint on the granting of trade credit must lie. 
Risk, Liquidity and Trade Credit 
The volume of cash and government securities held by business firms 
depends upon the cash flows needed to maintain operations. The assets 
held to satisfy those needs take the form of a normal transactions balance 
and a contingency, or precautionary, balance. Short term government 
securities may well satisfy the latter requirement. The level of 
liquidity needed to satisfy these requirements also depends upon the 
variability of the firm's cash inflows. As the variability of the firm's 
cash inflows increases, the financial risk,^  which must be covered by 
precautionary balances, increases also, ceteris paribus. Therefore, it 
would appear desirable for firms which experience high sales variability 
to maintain high liquidity levels to protect themselves from financial 
risk. Other considerations, however, work to mitigate this situation. 
The trade credit policy of the firm should be jointly determined with 
the liquidity position. The decision to grant trade credit, ceteris 
paribus« is also a decision to reduce the firm's liquidity level. 
Granting trade credit involves a loss of liquidity that increases the 
T^he term financial risk is used here to mean risk of firm failure 
resulting from financial causes. 
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firm's financial risk. Nonetheless, trade credit is a competitive de­
vice. Failure to grant trade credit may result in the loss of a sale to 
other competitors, especially in periods of tight money. Thus, the con­
sideration of the firm's financial risk must be tempered by the considera­
tion of its potential sales loss and the consequent reduction in cash 
flow if trade credit is not granted. Furthermore, if the firms have high 
sales variability, which results in high variation of cash inflows, they 
may look upon the granting of trade credit and the consequent lowering 
of the liquidity position as a method of stabilizing the variation. 
This line of reasoning suggests that the firm may have some minimum 
level of liquidity below which it would prefer not to go. Until this 
level of liquidity is reached, the granting of trade credit may be a 
passive response to demand from credit-worthy customers. Given a supra-
minimal level of liquidity, the firm would tend to give priority to both 
aspects of sales risk, especially since trade credit contributes directly 
to the primary goals of the firm—sales and profits. The financial risk 
would not be a significant constraint until the actual liquidity level 
of the firm was close to or below the minimum acceptable level. At this 
point, the firm's trade credit policy should become active rather than 
passive. 
Note that in Nadiri's model, the relationship between liquidity and 
accounts receivable is expected to be negative and significant. Under 
the risk hypothesis, however, this would only be the case when firms 
either ignore financial risk or are considerably restrained by monetary 
policy. A positive association with accounts receivable would be 
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consistent with the hypothesis that firms maintained near minimal 
liquidity levels when monetary conditions were easy. More logically, 
firms would decrease liquidity somewhat, but perhaps not significantly 
if they feared financial risk. 
Thus, the level of liquidity is a factor in trade credit determina­
tion but is itself subject to many interrelated forces. The model pre­
sented below will incorporate liquidity as a possible constraint on the 
granting of trade credit. The question yet to be raised is; Does the 
liquidity level of firms actually reach such low levels that it serves 
as a significant constraint to the granting of trade credit? The answer 
to this question has important consequences for the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. 
The purpose of a restrictive monetary policy is, in general, to 
eliminate the marginal borrower from the market for loanable funds and, 
thus, to restrict the growth of aggregate demand. In this context, the 
marginal borrower can be viewed as one who proposes to debt-finance an 
expenditure which promises only a marginal contribution to the growth in 
aggregate supply. Marginal borrowers, by this definition, are so classi­
fied according to the projects they propose to undertake through debt-
financing. A general monetary policy should not, therefore, systematical­
ly exclude particular types of firms or individuals in each tight money 
period. When such an exclusion occurs, monetary policy is said to operate 
in a discriminatory manner or that differential effects arise from the 
exercise of monetary policy. It is this sort of effect which Galbraith 
(1957) claimed, which Christian and Mazek (1969) and Silber and Polakoff 
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(1970) supported empirically. Meltzer (I960, 1963) argued, however, that 
the trade credit mechanism compensated for these discriminatory effects. 
In particular, Meltzer showed that a restrictive monetary policy would 
have the effect of redistributing liquidity from the large firms who re­
ceived favored treatment by the banking system to the smaller firms who 
were discriminated against. It has been hypothesized above, however, that 
firms, even large firms, may have a minimum acceptable level of liquidity, 
which corresponds to some maximum acceptable level of financial risk. 
There also exists, by hypothesis, a maximum acceptable level of sales 
risk. Under conditions of a restrictive monetary policy, the extent to 
which the trade credit mechanism compensates for a discriminatory alloca­
tion of financial resources by the bank credit mechanism should depend 
significantly upon the lending firms' relative sensitivity to financial 
risk and sales risk. A lending firm which is relatively sensitive to 
sales risk should display a much stronger propensity to extend trade 
credit during tight money periods than one which is sensitive to financial 
risk. Thus, as the relative sensitivity of firms to sales risk increases, 
their use of the trade credit mechanism to compensate for the discriminatory 
effects of monetary policy should increase also. 
The Model 
Within the framework presented above, it is hypothesized that there 
exists an optimal or desired level of trade credit for the business firm. 
Since, in a given period, the firm may not achieve this desired level, 
its reaction is assumed to follow a partial adjustment scheme. Thus, the 
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change in accounts receivable in time period ^  is expressed as: 
(ARt - = (1-X)(AR* - (4.1) 
where AR<. is the desired level of accounts receivable, \ is the partial 
adjustment coefficient and ^ t-1 the level of accounts receivable in the 
previous period. The desired level of accounts receivable is treated as 
a function of sales (S) and the firms liquidity position (LQ), giving: 
The liquidity position, as in the previous studies mentioned, is defined 
as the quick asset ratio; the ratio of cash plus government security 
holdings to current liabilities. Substituting 4.2 into 4,1, and solving 
for accounts receivables yields; 
But liquidity itself is a jointly dependent variable in the model. 
The optimal, or desired, level of liquidity is hypothesized to be a func­
tion of the expected availability of bank credit to the firm and the sales 
variance the firm normally experiences. The measure of credit availa­
bility to the firm employed in this study is the loan-to-deposit ratio 
(L/D). No a priori sign will be attached to the relationship between 
desired liquidity and the expected loan-to-deposit ratio because two op­
posing forces are at work. If the firm places emphasis on the financial 
risk aspect, it would desire to increase liquidity, or at least protect it, 
when tighter monetary conditions were expected. But if the firm is feel­
ing relatively strong sales risk pressures, it would be willing to deplete 
ARJ = + 02LQt (4,2) 
AR^  = 0j^ (l-"X)S^ . + 02(1-^ )LQt (4,3) 
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its liquidity position if necessary. 
Similarly, the sign on sales variance will not be assigned a priori. 
The firm's reaction to high sales variance is influenced by dual and op­
posing considerations. If the firm increases its liquidity level in 
response to high sales variability, hence high cash flow variability, it 
is indicating that it is sensitive to financial risk. If the firm de­
creases its liquidity level as sales variance increases, sensitivity to 
sales risk is indicated if the firm is increasing its trade credit at 
the same time. In the current period, it would be logical to expect a 
negative relationship between sales variance and liquidity in any case, 
since sales variance contributes directly to variation in the firm's cash 
inflows. Thus, the comparison of liquidity with lagged sales variance 
may say more about the relationship between sales risk and financial risk 
than comparison with current period sales variance. 
Thus, desired liquidity at time t (LQ*) is formulated as; 
LQ* = a^ (L/D)^  + (4.4) 
where (L/D)^  is the loan-to-deposit ratio expected in time t-1 to prevail 
in period and is the sales variance for period 
Similar to accounts receivable, the firm is hypothesized to have a 
desired level of liquidity. When the desired level of liquidity is not 
attained, the firm is assumed to adjust partially in the following manner: 
(LQ - LQt_i) = (1-?)(LQ* - (4.5) 
where f is the adjustment coefficient. Substituting 4.4 into 4,5 and 
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solving for liquidity yields; 
LQt = (l-<)a^ (L/D)t + (1-e )a^ V^  +eLQ^ _i (4.6) 
Assuming that the expected loan-to-deposit ratio for the next period 
follows adaptive expectations gives: 
[(L/D)f - (L/D)^ i] = (l-ji) [(L/D)t - (L/D)'^ j^ ] (4.7) 
where p is the adjustment coefficient. Solving 4.7 for the expected 
loan-to-deposit ratio yields: 
(L/D)** = (l-;i)(L/D)j. +;i(L/D)^  ^ (4.8) 
Expressing 4.6 as the t-1 period equation, the liquidity equation becomes: 
LQt-i = (l-?)a^ (L/D)^  + (l-()a2Vt_i +(LQ^ _2 (4.9) 
Solving for the expected loan-to-deposit ratio yields: 
(I'/D)^ !i = (i4)a^  Vt-1 - (l-?)a^  LQt.2 
Substituting 4.10 into 4.8 gives: 
(L/D)f = (1.^ )(L/D), +  ^
Substituting 4.11 into 4.6 gives: 
LQt = (l-?)ai(l-;i)(L/D)t + ( l-^ );ia2Vt_i+(iH-( )LQ^ _i 
-;I?LQ^ _2 +(l-f)o2 Vt (4.12) 
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Collecting terms, the equation for liquidity becomes; 
- ptLQt_2 (4.13) 
Forming a recursive two equation simultaneous system for the joint de­
termination of liquidity and accounts receivable results in the following 
model: 
"1 = LQt + Pi2\ + ^13Vt-l-*^ 14^ Qt-l-*^ 15^ Qt-2-^ l6(^ /^ )t <4.14) 
"2 = ^ 21® + ARt + P27St + P28^ t-1 (4.15) 
The reduced form of the accounts receivable equation is: 
ARt = 0i(l-»St + 02(l-%)[(l-?)Gi(l-p) (L/D)t + (;i+e)LQ^ _^  
+ (l-^ >P^ 2^ t-l^  +^ t^-l (4.16) 
The model also was reformulated and tested in terms of net re­
ceivables, The empirical results and comparisons of both forms are pre­
sented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The data used for the analysis were taken from the FTC-SEC Quarterly 
Financial Reports for Manufacturing Corporations with the exception of the 
loan-to-deposit ratio, which was compiled from various issues of the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. Observations cover forty quarters from 1960 II 
through 1970 I. The sales variance variable was computed by taking a 
twelve quarter moving variance based on current sales and the sales of 
the previous eleven quarters. 
After the tests were run on the full forty quarters, the period was 
divided into two subperiods of twenty quarters each. Subperiod I covers 
1960 II through 1965 I and subperiod II covers 1965 II through 1970 I. 
First, dividing the period allows comparison of empirical results for 
periods in which monetary policy was clearly different, and thus provides 
additional information concerning the effect of monetary policy on trade 
credit. The first subperiod is one of monetary ease almost throughout. 
The second subperiod is marked by monetary restraint, especially in the 
years 1966, 1968 and 1969.^  
Second, the results of the full period tests were in conflict with 
the findings of other studies, which suggests that the relationships may 
not be stable. Testing across two periods with different degrees of 
monetary restraint provides evidence on the stability of the functions. 
F^or a good discussion of the status of monetary policy during the 
period 1960-68, see Hart, et al., (1969). 
38 
The results of the regression equations are presented in Tables 1 
through 10. Table 1 contains the results for the total manufacturing 
sector in the aggregate. For convenience, the tables for the asset 
sizes are ordered by dependent variables. Table 2 contains the results 
for the full period stage two liquidity equation; Tables 3 and 4 contain 
the results for subperiods I and II respectively. Tables 5, 6 and 7 are 
the results of the stage two accounts receivable equations in the same 
order and Tables 8, 9 and 10 are the results for the stage two net re­
ceivables equations similarly arranged. 
The asset sizes, in dollars, are abbreviated as follows: 
LOM - less than one million 
OFM - one-to^ five million 
FTM - five-to-ten million 
TTF - ten-to-twenty-five million 
TFF - twenty-five-to-fifty million 
FOH - fifty-to-one-hundred million 
HTF - one-hundred-to-two-hundred-fifty million 
TFB - two-hundred-fifty million-to-one billion 
GOB - over one billion 
TOT - totals, all asset sizes. 
Equations for Total Manufacturing 
Liquidity equation (4.13) 
The results for manufacturing corporations in the aggregate appears 
in Table 1. In examining the liquidity equation for the full period. 
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Table 1. Regression results for the total manufacturing sector^  
A. Liquidity equation (4.13) 
• Vt Vt.l tSt-l LQt-2 L/D R2 
Full period -.001 
(3.90) 
.0004 
(2.50) 
.988 
(5.57) 
-.263 
(1.56) 
-.024 
(0.22) 
.99 
Subperiod I .002 
(1.16) 
-.001 
(0.54) 
.481 
(1.22) 
-.620 
(1.39) 
.313 
(0.79) 
.82 
Subperiod II -.0005 
(2.39) 
.0002 
(0.54) 
.731 
(1.98) 
-.174 
(0.58) 
-.156 
(0.99) 
.98 
B. Accounts receivable equation (4.15, Stage : 2) 
St ARt-1 LQ R2 
Full period .140 
(3.68) 
.895 
(17.08) 
15.974 
(3.32) 
.99 
Subperiod 1 .270 
(1.51) 
.031 
(0.07) 
-2.313 
(0.21) 
.99 
Subperiod II .134 
(2.15) 
.936 
(8.71) 
19.874 
(2.24) 
.99 
c. Net receivables equation (4.15 modified for net receivables. Stage 2) 
St (AR-AP)^ _1 LQ R2 
Full period .069 
(1.31) 
.801 
(4.85) 
6.537 
(0.97) 
.99 
Subperiod I .199 
(1.92) 
.326 
(0.83) 
11.536 
(1.17) 
.98 
Subperiod II .077 
(1.05) 
.713 
(2.60) 
2.807 
(0.24) 
.99 
®"t" values in parentheses. 
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sales variance, lagged sales variance, and lagged liquidity are significant 
at the 5% level.^  The loan-to-deposit ratio is negative but far from 
significant. Thus, manufacturing firms in the aggregate appear willing 
to lower liquidity levels, but not significantly, as monetary policy 
tightens. Examination of the mean elasticities of the equations, for the 
full period and both subperiods, in Appendix A, Tables 12, 13 and 14 re­
veal that inordinately large movements of the loan-to-deposit ratio are 
required to influence liquidity. 
Comparison of the results for the two subperiods reveals a positive, 
but nonsignificant relationship between liquidity and the loan-to-
deposit ratio in subperiod I and a negative but nonsignificant relation­
ship in subperiod II. Thus, the relationship changes from positive to 
negative in moving from a period of monetary ease to a period of monetary 
restraint. This finding indicates that monetary policy is felt to some 
extent by manufacturing firms, but the fact that neither coefficient is 
significant considerably weakens the force of this evidence. 
The results do tend to support the hypothesis that financial risk is 
considered by business firms. The evidence indicates that firms are 
willing to lower liquidity levels but that they also attempt to prevent 
liquidity from falling below minimal levels. The move to protect liquidity 
is supported by the sales variance results described below. If at the 
same time, firms decrease their responsiveness to the demand for trade 
S^ignificance levels are quoted for the one tail test for variables 
which have their signs predicted a priori and for the two tail test for 
those which do not. The variables with a priori signs are lagged liquid­
ity, two period lagged liquidity, sales, lagged receivables, and lagged 
net receivables. 
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credit during tight money periods the risk hypothesis will have sub­
stantial support. Results supporting this hypothesis will be presented 
below. 
As hypothesized, the coefficient of the lagged sales variance changes 
signs from that of the current sales variance. The negative sign for 
coefficients on all but one (TTF) of the asset sizes for current sales 
variance indicates that firms experiencing high sales variance are unable 
to prevent their liquidity from dropping, or at least that they do not 
attempt to avoid it immediately. The inability to maintain liquidity 
may result from the cash flow variation produced by the sales variation. 
By the next period firms appear to have sufficiently recovered their 
liquidity positions; lagged sales variance is positively associated 
with liquidity in the equation for the full period. The positive asso­
ciation indicates that firms seek to maintain liquidity levels and that 
they do move to restore lost liquidity fairly rapidly. These results are 
consistent with the risk hypothesis. 
Further support for the risk hypothesis appears in the subperiod 
equations for liquidity. For the sales variance variables in sub-
period II, the same relationship appears to hold true that was indicated 
for the full period, although the coefficient of lagged sales variance is 
not significant. The nonsignificant coefficient might be interpreted as 
evidence that restrictive monetary policy restrains firms from fully re­
covering their liquidity levels. The results for subperiod I are distinct­
ly different from the full period and subperiod II. The signs on the 
coefficients of sales variance and lagged sales variance are reversed 
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and neither is significant. The reversal of signs supports the view that 
firms are not overly concerned with their liquidity position in periods 
of monetary ease. Thus, financial risk would not be as strong a con­
sideration in easy money periods since funds are more easily obtainable. 
Accounts receivable equation (4.15) 
For the full accounts receivable equation, all three independent 
variables are positive and significant at the 1% level. The major point 
of interest here is the relationship between liquidity and the level of 
accounts receivable. The positive relationship stands in direct con­
tradiction to the findings of Nadiri (1969) who observed a negative and 
significant relationship.^  For subperiod II, the results are similar to 
the full period, although sales and liquidity are significant only at 
the 57o level. 
For subperiod I, the results are reversed. There is a negative 
but nonsignificant relationship between liquidity and accounts re­
ceivable. The sales coefficient is significant only at the 10% level 
and the coefficient for lagged accounts receivable is not significant at 
all. The change of sign on the coefficients for liquidity between the 
two subperiods provides additional support for the risk hypothesis. In 
the easy money period, manufacturing firms in the aggregate were willing 
to decrease liquidity to increase trade credit. In the tight money 
period, firms were willing to increase trade credit if liquidity increased 
'•Two factors may contribute to the difference in results. One, the 
time periods involved are different, although there is a four year overlap. 
Secondly, Nadiri stated that he used seasonal dummies, but does not state 
if he used a trend dumny. If not, this could account for some, if not 
most, of the difference. Liquidity levels for firms have trended down­
ward, while levels of accounts receivable have grown. 
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also. 
The low level of significance for the sales coefficient could be 
the result of a somewhat passive response for the trade credit decision 
during expansive, easy money periods. The availability of credit in 
general and the lack of demand for trade credit during such periods may 
be strong contributory factors in creating a passive response to the 
granting of trade credit. 
Net receivables equation (4.15 modified for net receivables) 
The full period net receivables equation does not display the high 
significance levels that the accounts receivables equation does. Liquid­
ity is not significantly associated with net receivables and the coeffi­
cient of sales would be significant only at levels beyond 10%, which 
are normally not acceptable. The results for the subperiods are similar. 
In subperiod I, sales is significant at the 10% level and lagged net 
receivables is nonsignificant. Subperiod II reveals results very close 
to those for the full period. The signs of the coefficients remain posi­
tive on all three independent variables for the full period and both 
subperiods. 
Results by Asset Sizes 
Liquidity equation (4.13) 
The adjusted coefficients of determination (R^ ) exhibited by the 
results are generally high. An exception to the rule is found in the 
liquidity equation for the LOM asset size, in both subperiods and the 
full period. The general decline in the R^  experienced in the two 
periods is largely the result of the adjustment for degrees of freedom. 
44 
Table 2. Regression results by asset sizes: liquidity equation (4.13), 
full period 
Vt Vt_l LQt-l LQt-2 L/D R2 
LOM -.003 .008 .106 -.048 -.246 .30 
(.38) (1.01) (.58) (.27) (2.30) 
OFM -.039 .035 .540 -.173 -.056 .94 
(2.41) (2.09) (2.87) (.83) (.45) 
FTM -.249 .348 .725 .051 -.011 .95 
(1,28) (1.87) (3.85) (.26) (.05) 
TTF .089 -.265 .126 .092 -.483 .94 
(.75) (2.13) (.78) (.62) (1.82) 
TFF -.193 .053 .616 -.298 -.105 .97 
(1.33) (.35) (3.32) (1.55) (.76) 
FOH -.088 -.043 .644 .044 .258 .96 
(.62) (.32) (3.39) (.22) (.87) 
HTF -.061 .054 .239 .431 -.251 .98 
(2.34) (2.17) (1.07) (1.90) (1.71) 
TFB -.003 .002 .694 .002 -.091 .93 
(.44) (.35) (3.11) (.01) (.50) 
OOB .001 -.001 1.011 -.120 -.206 .98 
(1.22) (.83) (5.70) (.64) (.70) 
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Table 3, Regression results by asset sizes: liquidity equation (4.13) 
subpefiod 1 
"t 't-l Wt.i LQt.2 L/D r2 
LOM .005 .014 -.017 -.067 -.381 .29 
(.24) (.60) (.05) (.18) (1.08) 
OFM -.004 .003 .010 -.044 .155 .96 
(.19) (.13) (.03) (.15) (1.13) 
FTM -.551 .921 .317 -.299 -.973 .92 
(1.79) (2.91) (1.19) (1.15) (2.24) 
TTF -.188 .039 1.022 -. 286 -.103 .87 
(.93) (.18) (3.85) (1.40) (.27) 
TFF .137 .407 .472 -.090 -1.609 .91 
(.35) (1.05) (1.13) (.27) (2.35) 
FOH -.307 .288 .750 -.191 .993 .90 
(.69) (.76) (2.26) (.68) (1.19) 
HTF -.078 -.007 -.052 -.293 .724 .94 
(1.71) (.17) (.15) (.86) (1.87) 
TFB -.071 .038 .408 .153 1.089 .87 
(2.07) (1.46) (1.10) (.41) (2.16) 
OOB .014 .010 .342 .016 -.424 .88 
(1.96) (.81) (.98) (.06) (.57) 
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Table 4. Regression results by asset sizes: liquidity equation (4.13), 
subperiod II 
V t V»_i LQ^ , L/D R? 
^t-1 ^^t-1 LQt-2 
LOM -.002 .007 .147 -.080 -.275 .45* 
(.15) (.47) (.47) (.23) (1.33) 
OFM .018 -.033 .348 -.335 -.650 .72 
(.57) (.96) (1.26) (1.17) (2.36) 
FTM -.091 .007 .440 .035 -.685 .75 
(.48) (.03) (1.60) (.13) (2.44) 
TTF .220 -.519 -.297 -.136 -.373 .70 
(.66) (1.65) (1.08) (.55) (.52) 
TFF -.315 -.019 .684 -.411 -.176 .88 
(1.55) (.09) (2.28) (1.46) (1.03) 
FOH .0002 -.095 .544 .067 -.051 .86 
(.002) (.87) (1.79) (.26) (.20) 
HTF -.052 .022 .231 .038 -.457 .93 
(1.89) (.78) (.60) (.14) (2.08) 
TFB -.013 .010 .352 .171 -.096 .87 
(2.10) (1.54) (1.34) (.63) (.45) 
OOB .0003 -.0005 .898 .118 -.356 .95 
(.13) (.28) (2.60) (.26) (.80) 
h^is is r2 for LOM, not R^ . 
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For the full period, the coefficient for sales variance displays 
a negative sign in seven of the nine asset sizes. Only the coefficients 
for TTF and the largest asset size, OOB, are positive. Only two of the 
nine are significant at the 10% level. As with the results for total 
manufacturing, most of the asset sizes appear to be unable or unwilling 
to maintain liquidity levels when sales variance is high. One inter­
pretation of this finding is that firms must cover fixed commitments as 
inflows vary. The firms appear, however, to be able to recover their 
liquidity positions within one quarter, as evidenced by the positive 
coefficients on lagged sales variance for six of the nine asset sizes, 
three of the six are significant at the 10% level. The two asset groups 
which displayed positive coefficients for sales variance had negative 
coefficients for lagged sales variance. 
The conclusions reached by examining the liquidity equation for 
total manufacturing are generally supported by the asset sizes equations. 
Firms recovering liquidity, in lagged response to increased sales vari­
ance, is taken as evidence of consideration of financial risk. The sub-
period results are also consistent with the equations for total manu­
facturing. 
For subperiod I, only one asset size, HTF, has a negative coefficient 
for lagged sales variance. But even this coefficient shows a positive 
movement relative to the current sales variance. Subperiod 11 reveals 
five negative coefficients for lagged sales variance. This finding indi­
cates that recovery or building of the liquidity position is restrained 
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more during tight money periods. The fact that four of the coefficients 
on sales variance are positive and turn negative for lagged sales vari­
ance does not, however, support this view. 
For the loan-to-deposit ratio, only the smallest asset size, LOM, 
displays a coefficient which is significant at approximately the 5% 
level. Eight of the nine coefficients are negative. The connection be­
tween liquidity and credit availability shows a fairly sharp contrast be­
tween the two subperiods. In subperiod I only five of the nine asset 
sizes have negative coefficients for the loan-to-deposit ratio; two of 
these are significant at the 5% level. In subperiod II, all nine of the 
coefficients are negative with three significant. In subperiod I, four 
of the five smallest asset sizes have negative coefficients for the loan-
to-deposit ratio, but only one of the four largest, OOB, is negative. 
In subperiod II, the t values for the three smallest asset sizes are 
generally larger than the t values for the larger asset sizes. 
The results lend support to the view that monetary policy is ef­
fective in influencing the liquidity levels of manufacturing firms. 
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the influence is strongest on 
the smallest asset sizes. The influence, however, is mild, as shown by 
the number of non significant coefficients for the loan-to-deposit ratio. 
Accounts receivable equation (4.15) 
In the accounts receivable equation for the full period, the co­
efficient of sales is positive and significant at the 1% level for all 
asset sizes. The coefficient for lagged accounts receivable is positive 
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Table 5. Regression results by asset sizes: accounts receivable 
equation (4.15), full period 
St A%t_l 
yv. 
LQ R2 
LOM .292 .124 5.660 .98 
(8.23) (1.22) (2.11) 
OFM .175 .247 -4.877 .99 
(4.49) (2.20) (3.23) 
FTM .272 .129 -.897 .97 
(3.91) (.97) (1.48) 
TTF .281 .476 1.009 .99 
(6.70) (4.56) (2.21) 
TFF .333 .382 -.754 .98 
(4.49) (3.21) (.74) 
FOH .293 .689 1.360 .98 
(4.38) (6.03) (2.66) 
HTF .313 .352 1.638 .99 
(5.08) (3.00) (1.05) 
TFB .153 .855 4.865 .99 
(2.69) (12.60) (1.79) 
OOB .167 .747 .127 .99 
(2.30) (6.27) (.06) 
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Table 6. Regression results by asset sizes: accounts receivable 
equation (4.15), subperiod I 
St AR^ _^  LQ R2 
LOM .152 .529 -2.535 .95 
(1.57) (2.20) (.46) 
OFM .324 .197 2.246 .99 
(4.65) (1.63) (.33) 
FTM .380 .101 .227 .99 
(8.54) (.85) (.81) 
TTF .201 -.092 -3.059 .97 
(1.20) (.45) (1.11) 
TFF .506 -.340 -1.744 .98 
(4.58) (1.79) (1.72) 
FOH .358 .536 .379 .88 
(2.02) (1.37) (.34) 
HTF .291 .325 2.388 .98 
(2.19) (1.71) (.70) 
TFB .324 .272 2.292 .98 
(3.68) (1.06) (1.13) 
OOB .138 .211 -.076 .99 
(1.44) (.84) (.04) 
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Table 7, Regression results by asset sizes; accounts receivable 
equation (4.15), subperiod II 
St ARt.i LQ 
LOM .322 -.102 -3.622 .98 
(12.45) (1.31) (2.46) 
OFM .224 .202 -6.539 .94 
(3.00) (1.00) (2.61) 
FTM .299 -.245 -3.864 .89 
(4.04) (1.53) (4.65) 
TTF .274 .481 .467 .94 
(3.53) (2.81) (.68) 
TFF .306 .283 -2.790 .95 
(5.02) (3.08) (4.43) 
FOH .344 .592 1.526 .99 
(4.76) (4.85) (1.72) 
HTF .371 .047 -1.119 .97 
(4.72) (.16) (.34) 
TFB .203 .548 -6.179 .98 
(1.38) (1.98) (.77) 
OOB -.102 .161 19.036 .99 
(.94) (.06) (2.80) 
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and significant at the 5% level for all but two of the asset groups, 
LOM and FTM, The most interesting results, however, are found in the 
coefficients and significance levels of the liquidity variable. Evi­
dence that monetary policy exerts discriminatory effects can be noted in 
the full period results. Comparison of the two subperiods strongly re­
inforces this interpretation. 
In the full period equation, six of the nine coefficients for 
liquidity are positive. Three of these, LOM, TTF, and FOH, are sig­
nificant at the 10% level. Three of the five smallest asset groups have 
negative signs for the liquidity coefficient, but none of the four largest 
asset groups display this characteristic. The results are more striking-
by contrast of the two subperiods. 
In subperiod I, the coefficient for liquidity is negative for four 
sizes but nonsignificant in all sizes. As expected, liquidity appears 
not to have been a constraint on the granting of trade credit during 
the period of monetary ease. For subperiod II, however, six of the nine 
asset sizes have negative coefficients for liquidity and four of these 
are significant at the 5% level. More importantly, the four significant 
sizes are among the five smallest asset groups, including the three 
smallest asset sizes. Only two of the four largest asset sizes have 
negative coefficients for liquidity, and neither is significant. 
When the results of the subperiod II accounts receivable equation 
are coupled with the results of the subperiod II liquidity equation find­
ings for the loan-to-deposit ratio, the evidence that monetary policy 
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exerts discriminatory effects is quite strong. The ability of the 
smaller firms to grant trade credit seems to be noticeably restrained 
by liquidity considerations. The larger asset groups apparently were 
not subjected to the same constraint. Firms in the largest asset group, 
OOB, were apparently able to increase liquidity relative to their grant­
ing of trade credit. 
Net receivables equation (4.15 modified for net receivables) 
The net receivables results reveal an interesting relationship be­
tween sales and net receivables. As previously noted, manufacturing firms 
should display a reasonably strong relationship between net receivables 
and sales since they are generally net lenders on trade account. For 
the full period, the coefficient on sales is positive and significant at 
the 57o level for only six of the nine asset sizes. For subperiod I this 
relationship is true for only two asset sizes and for subperiod II for 
only four asset sizes. Note that in subperiod II, one size; the largest, 
has a negative coefficient for sales that would be significant at the 
5% level for the two tail test. None of the three largest asset sizes 
display significant and positive sales coefficients. Thus, sales do not 
appear to dominate the level of net receivables. 
Liquidity appears even weaker. The movements of liquidity with re­
lation to movements of net receivables, however, can be somewhat mis­
leading due to the composition of the two variables. If firms increase 
net receivables by extending more trade credit than they take, their 
liquidity level, ceteris paribus, should fall; an inverse relationship 
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Table 8, Regression results by asset sizes; net receivables equation 
(4.15 modified for net receivables), full period 
S J. (AR-AP)(._j^  LQ R2 
LOM .051 .452 5.765 .97 
(2.55) (3.09) (2.57) 
OFM -.004 .375 -2.713 .84 
(.07) (2.12) (.94) 
FTM .176 .434 -.059 .90 
(3.45) (4.06) (.17) 
TTF .175 .243 .759 .98 
(5.88) (1.97) (2.60) 
TFF .174 .617 -.218 .96 
(2.48) (5.44) (.26) 
FOH .292 .366 .672 .98 
(6.35) (3.20) (1.93) 
HTF .077 .494 -1.119 .99 
(1.51) (3.79) (.76) 
TFB .060 .828 1.053 .99 
(.86) (6.93) (.36) 
COB .164 .357 .376 .98 
(2.98) (1.79) (.18) 
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Table 9, Regression results by asset sizes: net receivables equation 
(4.15 modified for net receivables), subperiod I 
St (AR-AP)t_j^  LQ R2 
LOM ,030 .712 .746 .90 
(.44) (2.76) (.12) 
OFM .070 .580 3.943 .92 
(.61) (1.69) (.31) 
FTM .224 .204 .486 .97 
(4.73) (1.11) (1.73) 
TTF -.067 -.177 -3.385 .91 
(.36) (.70) (1.22) 
TFF ,222 -.136 -.713 . .94 
(1.63) (.43) (.54) 
FOH ,209 .406 .821 .91 
(1.54) (1.47) (1.66) 
HTF .059 .754 1.170 .95 
(.57) (4.01) (.38) 
TFB .242 .315 .176 .90 
(2.52) (.63) (.06) 
OOB .032 .179 -.230 .94 
(.37) (.38) (.11) 
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Table 10. Regression results by asset sizes: net receivables equation 
(4.15 modified for net receivables), subperiod II 
(AR-AP)^ _i LQ R2 
LOM .082 .101 7.297 .94 
(3.34) (.45) (3.23) 
OFM .025 .418 -.993 .22 
(.19) (1.38) (.20) 
FTM .131 .423 -.295 .49 
(1.67) (2.17) (.47) 
TTF .165 .222 .546 .91 
(3.19) (1.05) (1.43) 
TFF ' .165 .387 -1.228 .83 
(2.46) (2.81) (2.04) 
FOH .360 .219 -.833 .94 
(5.35) (1.25) (.72) 
HTF .051 -.129 -2.999 .96 
(1.00) (.57) (1.87) 
TFB .143 .224 -9.431 .98 
(1.28) (.87) (1.93) 
OOB -.227 .007 14.44" .99 
(2.52) (.03) (3.71) 
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should be noted. On the other hand, if firms decrease net receivables 
by taking more trade credit than they grant, the result, ceteris paribus, 
would also be a lowered liquidity level. Decreasing net receivables in 
this manner would increase the denominator of the liquidity ratio. Thus, 
it is impossible to determine a priori which relationship should be normal. 
Liquidity coefficients in the full period net receivables equation 
are positive and significant just beyond the 5% level for three asset 
groups. The coefficient is negative and significant for one asset size. 
No clear pattern emerges. In subperiod I, none of the asset sizes have 
a significant coefficient for liquidity, and in subperiod II only one 
size, LOM, has a significant coefficient at the 57, level. The coefficient 
is positive. Thus liquidity, again contrary to the findings of Nadiri 
(1969), does not appear to be a significant factor in the determination of 
net receivables. 
Additional Evidence Relating to the Effective­
ness of Monetary Policy 
In addition to the previously mentioned effects of monetary policy 
on liquidity, the ability of monetary policy to affect the levels of 
trade credit granted will be examined. Under the hypothesis presented 
regarding financial risk, sales risk, and minimum levels of liquidity, 
the normal response of firms to tighter monetary conditions would be to 
increase their levels of trade credit granted until liquidity became a 
restraining factor. Breaking the full period into two equal subperiods 
with differing monetary policy emphasis allows a convenient comparison. 
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This comparison, is made in terms of the changes in the reduced form 
mean elasticities of accounts receivable with respect to the loan-to-
deposit ratio. During subperiod I, when easy monetary conditions pre­
vailed, it would be expected that the supply of trade credit would be 
highly responsive to the demand for trade credit. The financial risk 
factor would not be a strong influence. During subperiod II, with tight 
monetary conditions prevailing, the financial risk factor would be 
stronger. Hence, a lessening of the responsiveness of the supply of 
trade credit to its demand would be expected as monetary conditions 
tightened. The difference in the mean elasticities of accounts receiv­
able with respect to the loan-to-deposit ratio between the two sub-
periods should indicate the change in the responsiveness of the supply 
of trade credit to the demand for trade credit as monetary conditions 
tightened. 
The mean elasticities are found in Appendix A, Tables 25, 26 and 27. 
The differences between the two periods have been computed and are pre­
sented in Table 11. The total manufacturing sector and six of the nine 
asset sizes show a decreased tendency to increase trade credit as 
monetary policy tightened from relative ease to relative restraint. 
Also in Table 11 are the changes in the mean elasticities between 
the two subperiods for net receivables with respect to the loan-to-
deposit ratio. The change is negative for the total manufacturing sector 
and for five of the nine asset sizes. Four asset groups tended to in­
crease their granting of net trade credit when monetary conditions 
tightened. 
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Table 11. Changes in mean elasticities between subperiods for the 
loan-to-deposit ratio 
Asset 
size 
Mean elasticity 
difference 
AR and L/D 
Increase or 
decrease in 
responsiveness 
Mean elasticity 
difference 
(AR-AP) and L/D 
Increase or 
decrease in 
responsiveness 
LOM -.0965 Decrease -.4712 Decrease 
0PM .4134 Increase -.0077 Decrease 
FTM .7605 Increase .3338 Increase 
TTF -.0976 Decrease -.1847 Decrease 
TFF -.5344 Decrease .4679 Increase 
FOH -.0824 Decrease -.2328 Decrease 
HTF .7236 Increase ,0360 Increase 
TFB -.1440 Decrease .0473 Increase 
OOB -.2135 Decrease -.3560 Decrease 
TOT -.0201 Decrease -.1099 Decrease 
Although most asset sizes had positive relationships between accounts 
receivable and the loan-to-deposit ratio during both periods,^  the posi­
tive responsiveness to demand was in general less in the tight money-
period than in the easy money period. Only two asset sizes, FTM and 
HTF increased responsiveness in both accounts receivables and net re­
ceivables. Changes in the mean elasticities between liquidity and both 
O 
accounts receivable and net receivables indicate that these asset groups 
S^ee Appendix A, Tables 26, 27, 29 and 30. 
2 See Appendix A, Tables 16 and 18. 
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allowed their liquidity levels to fall as a result. Thus monetary-
policy was felt but was not effective in reducing either receivables 
or net receivables for these two asset sizes. The evidence supports 
the conclusion that monetary policy did restrict the granting of both 
gross and net trade credit, but because of the levels of significance 
exhibited by the variables, the degree of restriction does not appear to 
have been severe. 
Evidence Relating to Credit Reallocation 
Table 11 can also be used to compare the results of the tests with 
those obtained by Meltzer (1960, 1963). A positive difference in the 
mean elasticities for the two subperiods between net receivables and the 
loan-to-deposit ratio implies that firms were more responsive to demand 
in granting net trade credit during the tight money period. A negative 
difference implies less responsiveness. 
For the total manufacturing sector, responsiveness decreased, in­
dicating that monetary policy was effective in reducing the granting of 
net trade credit overall. Overlooking the largest asset group, OOB, 
there exists a tendency for the larger asset groups to increase their net 
lending under tighter monetary conditions. This evidence points to some 
redistributional effect of credit through the trade credit mechanism. 
Note that three of the four smallest asset groups decreased their net 
lending responsiveness. Considering the evidence that was cited above 
and in Table 6 that these groups are discriminated against in tight money 
periods, the evidence suggests that they do take advantage of trade credit 
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availability. Thus the results support the hypothesis that some re­
distribution of credit occurs through the trade credit mechanism. Un­
fortunately, the results do not provide information relating to the ex­
tent of the redistribution or the compensation for bank discrimination. 
Evidence Relating to the Trade Credit Decision 
An examination of the findings reported in Tables 6 and 7 reveals the 
following information. In subperiod I, sales are less significant as a de­
terminant of trade credit than in subperiod II, In subperiod I, three of 
the asset sizes and the totals have coefficients for sales that are not 
significant at the 5% level. Only four of the asset sizes have signifi­
cant sales coefficients at the 1% level. In subperiod II, seven of the 
nine asset sizes have significant sales coefficients at the 1% level. 
Note that these are the seven smaller groups by asset size. Only TFB and 
OOB, the two largest asset groups are not significant. The OOB asset 
size even has a negative sign for sales. 
The stronger relationship to sales during the tight money period 
might be interpreted in the following manner. When credit conditions are 
not restrained, funds may be obtained from various sources that, if the 
implicit cost of trade credit is computed, are less costly. The demand 
for trade credit would not be present for many sales. Since liquidity 
would not be under pressure from monetary restraint, firms should be more 
inclined to grant trade credit passively, in response to demand. 
But when monetary conditions tighten, the alternative sources of 
credit become both harder to obtain and more costly. Trade credit 
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becomes a more viable source of financing. A larger proportion of 
customers demand trade credit and, thus, sales become more significantly 
related to the levels of accounts receivable. 
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The primary findings of this study are as follows: 
1, Support has been given for the view that the trade credit de­
cision is a passive decision during periods of monetary ease. During 
periods of monetary restraint, however, the firm's trade credit policy 
is influenced by liquidity considerations. The evidence shows that most 
of the asset groups are affected by monetary policy. Firms either de­
creased their responsiveness to demand in granting trade credit or lowered 
their liquidity positions or both. 
2, Firms appear to recognize and to attempt to protect against 
financial risk factors. In general, firms seemed willing to lower their 
liquidity positions during periods of tight money, but not significantly. 
This reaction is consistent with the hypothesis that firms have some 
minimal level of liquidity below which they prefer not to go. Only the 
firms which feel intense sales risk factors would allow liquidity to 
drop below the minimal desired level. These firms appear to be those 
of the smaller asset sizes, who are mere risky borrowers and find credit 
less freely obtainable, 
3, The liquidity variable lent strong support to the thesis that 
monetary policy discriminates against the smaller asset sizes. During 
the subperiod characterized by tight monetary policy, liquidity acted as 
a strong constraint to the granting of trade credit for four of 
the five smallest asset sizes, thus constraining their ability to 
maintain sales. None of the four larger asset sizes were affected in 
the same manner. Two of these four small asset sizes increased their 
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responsiveness to demand for trade credit as monetary policy tightened, 
but only one asset size, FTM, was able to increase its net receivables 
responsiveness as well, indicating that this asset group felt strong 
sales pressures. 
4. The findings of Nadiri (1969) are seriously questioned. The 
liquidity variable did not have the influence as a determinant of trade 
credit that he noted. For the total manufacturing sector, liquidity had 
a positive and significant coefficient in the full period and in sub-
period II. For subperiod I, the coefficient was negative but not sig­
nificant. For the net receivables equations, the liquidity coefficient was 
positive but not significant for the full period and for both subperiods. 
Since liquidity was the element which made user cost significant in Nadiri's 
model, doubt must be case on the proposition that businesses treat trade 
credit as a user cost. 
5. Finally, evidence was presented that mildly supported the Meltzer 
(1960, 1963) hypothesis, that the differential effects of monetary policy 
are mitigated by the redistribution of credit through the trade credit 
mechanism. The fact that the differential effects were observable even 
with some credit redistribution supports the view that monetary policy is 
indeed discriminatory. The tests were not able to measure the extent or 
the exact redistribution of the credit. It may be that the redistribution 
is very uneven and that many firms are completely left out of the re­
distribution process. In any case, much more work at the firm level and 
across other sectors of the econony must be done before a final conclusion 
can be made on this issue. 
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Table 12, Mean elasticities by asset size and totals, liquidity 
equation, full period 
LOM -.0098 .0236 .1060 -.0483 -.5145 
0PM -.0678 .0606 .5461 -.1771 -.1166 
FTM -.0662 .0935 .7391 .0530 -.0202 
TTF .0385 -.1092 .1283 .0960 -.8764 
TFF -.0612 .0168 .6276 -.3096 -.1909 
FOH -.0300 -.0141 .6605 .0459 .4583 
HTF -.0992 .0869 .2443 .4505 -.4843 
TFB -.0266 .0197 .7054 .2108 -.0018 
OOB .0642 -.0430 1.0421 -.1275 -.2711 
TOT -.1828 .1165 1.0075 -.2749 .0425 
Table 13. Mean elasticities by asset size and totals, liquidity 
equation, subperiod I 
Vt \-l LQt-1 L/D 
LOM .0100 .0235 -.0166 -.0668 -.7420 
0PM -.0036 .0024 .0096 -.0044 .2693 
FTM -.1054 .1760 .3229 -.3104 -1.3912 
TTF -.0400 .0081 1.0339 -.2948 -.1445 
TFF .0292 .8218 .4787 -.0927 -2.2822 
FOH -.0535 .0505 .7700 -.1997 1.3043 
HTF -.0682 -.0065 -.0524 -.3024 1.0512 
TFB -.2696 .1427 .4148 .1588 2.0501 
OOB .1180 .0808 .3483 .0163 -.3802 
TOT .1604 -.0530 .4871 -.6370 .4295 
Table 14. Mean elasticities by asset size and totals, liquidity 
equation, subperiod II 
Vt Vt-l LQt-1 lQt-2 L/D 
LOM -.0094 .0268 .1469 -.0803 -.6150 
OFM .0492 -.0899 .3521 -.3457 -1.6538 
FTM -.0349 .0027 .4495 .0362 -1.7671 
TTF .1697 -.3752 -.3044 -.1433 -.9148 
TFF -.1482 -.0093 .7013 -.4296 -.4232 
FOH .0001 -.0550 .5578 .0715 -.1311 
HTF -.1482 .0607 .2380 .0410 -1.2403 
TFB -.2447 .1834 .3586 .1780 -.2801 
OOB .0353 -.0534 .9511 .1317 -.7964 
TOT -.3195 .1228 .7543 -.1854 -.3901 
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Table 15. Mean elasticities by asset size and totals, accounts receivable 
equation, full period 
St t^-1  ^
LOM .6760 .1229 .2835 
OFM .3799 .2440 -.2706 
FTM .5472 .1270 -.1317 
TTF .5390 .4707 .1080 
TFF .6147 .3772 -.0856 
FOH .5615 .6788 .1339 
HTF .6080 .3461 .0909 
TFB .3218 .8335 .1162 
OOB .3523 .7125 .0039 
TOT .2898 .8730 .0990 
Table 16. Mean elasticities by asset size and totals, accounts 
receivable equation, subperiods I and II 
Subperiod I Subperiod II 
St A*t_l LQ St ARt-l LQ 
LOM .3467 .5207 -.1434 .7549 -.1016 -.1630 
OFM .7022 .1942 .1646 .4855 .1990 -.2765 
FTM .7636 .1000 .0462 .6030 -.2421 -.3941 
TTF .3853 -.0908 -.4564 .5253 .4748 .0349 
TFF .9423 -.3344 -.2755 .5613 .2805 -.2240 
FOM .7282 .5287 .0531 .6287 .5821 .0996 
HTF .6016 .3199 .2022 .6893 .0463 -.0397 
TFB .7269 .2665 .0838 .4076 .5330 -.1007 
OOB .3200 .2033 -.0056 -.2074 .0153 .2646 
TOT .5854 .0300 -.0231 .2702 .9104 .0755 
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Table 17, Mean elasticities by asset size and totals, net receivables 
equation, full period 
S 
t 
(AR.AP)t_i LQ 
LOM .3550 .4445 .8733 
OFM -.0202 .3703 -.3431 
PTM .6370 .4304 -.0154 
TTF .5697 .2409 .1380 
TFF .5145 .6110 -.0398 
FOH .8929 .3607 .1056 
HTF .2464 .4849 -.1019 
TFB .2235 .8026 .0451 
OOB .7862 .3377 .0268 
TOT .2851 .7798 .0797 
Table 18. Mean elasticities by asset size and totals, net receivables 
equation, subperiods I and 11 
Subperiod I Subperiod II 
St (AR-AP)t_i LQ St (AR-AP)t_i LQ 
LOM .2199 .6966 .1412 .5503 .0997 .9413 
OFM .3313 .5708 .6347 .1261 .4143 -.0985 
FTM .7632 .2014 .1679 .4967 .4212 -.0567 
TTF -.2122 -.1752 -.8276 .5532 .2192 .0712 
TFF .6431 -.1342 -.1751 .4978 .3843 -.1624 
FOH .6873 .3991 .1905 1.0400 .2163 -.0858 
HTF .2079 .7391 .1680 .1515 -.1272 -.1712 
TFB 1.0641 .3056 .0126 .4883 .2173 -.2612 
OOB .1977 .1679 -.0452 -.9903 .0066 .4332 
TOT .8829 .3173 .2365 .3205 .6944 .0210 
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Table 19, Reduced form coefficients, by asset size and totals, for 
the accounts receivable equation, full period 
St ARt_i Vt Vt_l IQt-l lQt.2 L/D 
LOM .292 .124 -.017 .045 -.600 .272 -1.392 
OFM .175 .242 .190 -.171 -2.634 .844 .273 
FTM .272 .129 .223 -.312 -.650 -.046 .010 
TTF .281 .476 .090 -.267 .127 .093 -.487 
TFF .333 .382 .146 -.040 -.464 .225 .079 
FOH .293 .689 -.120 -.058 2.112 .598 .351 
HTF .313 .352 -.100 .088 .391 .706 -.411 
TFB .153 .855 .015 .010 3.376 .010 -.443 
OOB .167 .747 .0001 -.0001 .128 -.002 -.026 
TOT .140 .895 -.016 .006 15.782 -4.201 .383 
Table 20. Reduced form coefficients, by asset size and totals, for the 
accounts receivable equation, subperiod I 
St ARt-1 Vt Vt-1 LQt-1 LQt-2 L/D 
LOM .152 .529 -.004 -,033 «043 .170 .966 
OFM .324 .197 -.009 .007 .022 -.099 .348 
FTM .380 .101 -.125 .209 .072 -.068 -.221 
TTF .201 -.092 .575 -.119 -3.126 .875 .315 
TFF .506 -.340 -.239 -.710 -.823 .157 2.806 
FOH .358 .536 .116 -.109 -.284 .072 .376 
HTF .291 .325 .186 .017 .124 .480 -1.729 
TFB .324 .272 .163 .087 .935 .351 2.496 
OOB .138 .211 -.001 -.001 -.026 -.001 .032 
TOT .270 .031 -.005 .002 -1.113 1.434 -.724 
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Table 21, Reduced form coefficients, by asset size and totals, for the 
accounts receivable equation, subperiod II 
St AKfl 't-l IQt.l tSt-Z L/D 
LOM .322 -.102 .001 -.003 -.053 .029 .100 
OFM .224 .202 -.118 -.216 2.276 2.191 4.250 
FTM .299 -.245 .352 -.027 -1.700 -.135 2.647 
TTF .274 .481 .103 -.243 -.139 -.064 -.174 
TFF .306 .283 .879 .053 -1.908 1.147 .491 
FOH .344 .592 .0003 -.145 .830 .102 -.078 
HTF .371 .047 .058 -.025 -.258 -.043 .511 
TFB .203 .548 .080 -.062 -2.175 -1.057 .593 
OOB -.102 .161 .006 -.010 17.094 2.246 -6.777 
TOT .134 .940 -.010 .004 14.528 -3.458 -3.100 
Table 22. Reduced form coefficients, by asset size and totals, for the 
net receivables equation, full period 
St t^-l Vt Vt_i LQt.i LQt.2 L/D 
LOM .051 .452 -.018 .046 .611 -.277 -1.418 
OFM -.004 .375 .106 -.095 1.465 .469 .152 
FTM .176 .434 .249 -.021 -.725 -.051 .001 
TTF .175 .243 -.068 .201 -.096 -.070 .367 
TFF .174 .617 .042 -.012 -.134 .005 .023 
FOH .292 .366 -.060 -.029 .433 .030 .173 
HTF .077 .494 .068 -.060 -.267 -.482 .281 
TFB .060 .828 -.003 .002 .731 .002 -.096 
OOB .164 .357 .0003 -.0003 .380 -.045 -.077 
TOT .069 .801 -.007 .003 6.459 -1.719 .157 
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Table 23, Reduced form coefficients, by asset size and totals, for the 
net receivables equation, subperiod I 
St (AR-AP)^ _ .1 Vt Vt-1 LQt-l I'Qt-2 L/D 
LOM .030 .712 .004 .010 -.013 -.050 -.284 
OFM .070 .580 -.016 .012 .039 .173 .611 
FTM .224 .204 -.268 .448 .154 -.145 -.473 
TTP -.067 -.177 .636 -.132 -3.459 .968 .349 
TFF .222 -.136 .098 .290 .337 -.064 -1.147 
FOH .209 .406 -.252 .236 .616 -.157 .815 
HTF .059 .754 -.091 -.008 -.061 -.343 .847 
TFB .242 .315 -.012 .007 .072 .027 .192 
OOB .032 .179 -.003 -.002 -.079 -.004 .098 
TOT .199 .326 .023 -.012 5.549 -7.152 3.611 
Table 24. Reduced form coefficients, by asset size and totals, for the 
net receivables equation, subperiod 11 
St (AR-AP)^ .J Vt.i LQt-l LQcz VD 
LOM .082 .101 -.015 .051 1.073 -.584 -2.007 
OFM .025 .418 -.018 .033 -.346 .333 .645 
FTM .131 .423 .027 -.002 -.130 -.010 .202 
TTP .165 .222 .120 -.283 -.162 -.074 -.204 
TFF .165 .387 .387 .023 -.840 .505 .216 
FOH .360 .219 -.0001 .079 -.453 -.056 .042 
HTF .051 -.129 .156 -.066 -.693 -.114 1.371 
TFB .143 .224 .123 -.094 -3.320 -1.613 .905 
OOB -1.227 .007 .004 -.007 12.970 1.704 -5.142 
TOT .077 .714 -.001 .0002 2.052 -.488 -.438 
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Table 25, Mean elasticities for the accounts receivable reduced form 
equation, full period 
AR t-1 V. V t-1 ^^ t-l LQt_2 L/D 
LOM .6760 .1229 -.0024 .0063 -.0301 .0136 -.1458 
OFM .3799 ,2440 .0182 -.0163 -.1477 .0480 .0316 
FTM .5472 .1270 .0086 -.0122 -.0973 -.0070 .0027 
TTF .5390 .4707 .0042 -.0118 .0138 .0103 -.0947 
TFF .6147 .3772 .0052 -.0014 -.0537 .0265 .0162 
FOH .5615 .6788 -.0040 -.0018 .2135 .0621 .0613 
HTF .6080 .3461 -.0090 .0078 .0221 .0409 -.0440 
TFB .3218 .8335 .0036 .0023 .0820 .0002 -.0246 
OOB .3523 .7125 .0001 -.0001 .0041 -.0001 -.0010 
TOT .2898 .8730 -.0303 .3802 .0994 -.0268 .0042 
Table 26. Mean elasticities for the accounts receivable reduced form 
equation, subperiod 1 
AR t-1 V t-1 LQ t-1 LQ t-2 L/D 
LOM .3467 .5207 -.0004 -.0032 .0024 .0096 .1065 
OFM .7022 .1942 -.0006 .0004 .0016 -.0074 .0443 
FTM .7636 .1000 -.0048 .0081 .0149 -.0143 -.0644 
TTF .3853 -.0908 .0182 -.0037 -.4720 .1239 .0657 
TFF .9423 -.3344 -.0804 -.2266 -.1319 .0256 .6291 
FOH .7282 .5287 .0028 -.0026 -.0409 .0106 .0694 
HTF .6016 .3199 .0138 .0012 .0106 .0419 -.2126 
TFB .7269 .2665 .0219 .0119 .0348 .0133 .1722 
OOB .3200 .2033 -.0006 -.0005 -.0019 -.0001 .0021 
TOT .5854 .0300 -.0047 .0017 -.0112 .0147 -.0099 
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Table 27, Mean elasticities for the accounts receivable reduced form 
equation, subperiod II 
AR t-1 V t-1 LQt-1 t-2 L/D 
LOM .7549 -.1016 .0001 -.0005 -.0023 .0013 .0100 
OFM .4855 .1990 -.0137 -.0252 .0974 .0957 .4577 
FTM .6030 -.2421 .0136 -.0010 -.1769 -.0144 • .6961 
TTF .5253 .4748 .0059 -.0131 -.0106 -.0050 -.0319 
TFF .5613 .2805 .0331 .0020 -.1570 .0963 .0947 
FOH .6287 .5821 .00001 -.0054 .0556 .0070 -.0130 
HTF .6893 .0463 .0058 -.0024 -.0094 -.0016 .0492 
TFB .4076 .5330 .0247 -.0183 -.0361 -.0179 .0282 
OOB -.2074 .0153 .0098 -.0149 .2512 .0350 -.2114 
TOT .2702 .9104 -.0247 .0184 .0581 -.0141 -.0300 
Table 28. Mean elasticities for the net receivables reduced form 
equation, full period 
St (AR.AP)j.^  LQt.2 L/D 
LOM .3550 .4445 -.0079 .0196 .0927 -.0421 -.4493 
OFM -.0202 .3703 .0232 -.0207 .1873 .0608 .0402 
FTM .6370 .4304 .0174 -.0014 -.1950 -.0140 .0004 
TTF .5697 .2409 -.0053 .0151 -.0177 -.0132 .1211 
TFF .5145 .6110 .0024 -.0006 -.0248 .0123 .0076 
FOH .8929 .3607 -.0032 -.0014 .0698 .0486 .0482 
HTF .2464 .4849 .0100 -.0087 -.0248 -.0458 .0494 
TFB .2235 .8026 -.0013 .0008 .0319 .00001 -.0095 
OOB .7862 .3377 .0009 -.0008 .0280 -.0034 -.0072 
TOT .2851 .7798 -.0262 .0107 .0807 -.0220 .0034 
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Table 29. Mean elasticities for the net receivables reduced form 
equation, subperiod I 
St (AK-AP>t.i LQ^ .i LQj.2 L/D 
LOM .2199 .6966 .0013 .0031 -.0023 -.0092 -.1016 
OFM .3313 .5708 -.0023 .0017 .0063 .0284 .1708 
FTM .7632 .2014 -.0177 .0296 .0542 -.0520 -.2338 
TTF -.2122 -.1752 .0331 -.0067 -.8557 .2437 .1193 
TFF .6431 -.1342 .0051 .1437 .0839 -.0162 -.3993 
FOH .6873 .3991 -.0100 .0094 .1440 -.0374 .2438 
HTF .2079 .7391 -.0114 -.0010 -.0088 -.0507 .1765 
TFB 1.0641 .3056 -.0031 .0018 .0052 .0020 .0260 
OOB .1977 .1679 -.0048 -.0030 -.0158 -.0008 .0110 
TOT .8829 .3173 .0446 -.0218 .1154 -.1509 .1018 
Table 30. Mean elasticities for the net receivables reduced form 
equation, subperiod II 
(AR-AP)t.i Vt_i LQt_i LQt_2 L/D 
LOM .5503 .0997 -.0076 .0255 .1386 -.0756 -.5782 
OFM .1261 .4143 -.0049 .0090 -.0348 .0341 .1629 
FTM .4967 .4212 .0019 -.0001 -.0255 -.0020 .1000 
TTF .5532 .2192 .0120 -.0267 -.0216 -.0102 -.0654 
TFF .4978 .3843 .0240 .0014 -.1139 .0698 .0686 
FOH 1.0400 .2163 -.000004 .0047 -.0478 -.0061 .0110 
HTF .1515 -.1272 .0253 -.0105 -.0407 -.0069 .2125 
TFB .4883 .2173 .0648 -.0474 .0936 -.0466 .0733 
OOB -.9903 .0066 .0141 -.0224 .4124 .0572 -.3450 
TOT .3205 .6944 -.0047 .0009 .0158 -.0039 -.0081 
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APPENDIX B. SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF THE DATA 
With the exception of the loan-to-deposit ratio the data are taken 
from the FTC-SEC Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations. 
The data are compiled, on a quarterly basis, by the joint efforts of the 
Division of Financial Statistics in the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Office of Statistical Studies in the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
The estimates are representative af all firms required to file U.S. 
Corporation Income Tax Form 1120. Each firm filing this report has a 
known probability of being included in the sample taken from these re­
turns, which changes each quarter by one-eighth of the firms. Further, 
the changes made in the sample each quarter reflect corporate births, 
deaths, acquisitions, spin-offs, and mergers. 
The composition of the sample as of 1970 included 1/40 of all cor­
porate firms of asset size less than one million dollars, 1/4 of those 
with one-to-five million dollars in assets, 3/4 of those with five-to-
ten million dollars, and all corporate firms with assets over ten million 
dollars. 
The sample accounts for about six percent of the total number of 
corporations which possess about 88 percent of the total corporate assets. 
The final data estimates are based on the sample figures. An aggregated 
financial statement is then compiled for manufacturing by industry classi­
fication and asset size grouping. 
The exact title of the table used to gather data for this study is; 
Table 9. Financial statement for all manufacturing corporations, 
by asset size and industry group. 
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The following items were utilized from the table: 
AR; Other notes and accounts receivable (net). 
This is equal to total receivables minus receivables from U.S. 
Government, excluding tax credits. 
AP: Trade accounts and notes payable. 
S; Sales (net of returns, allowances, and discounts). 
LQ: This was defined as the ratio of cash plus government securities 
held to current liabilities. 
C: Cash on hand and in bank. 
G: U.S. Government securities, including Treasury savings notes. 
CL; Total current liabilities. 
This includes short term bank loans with maturities of 1 year or 
less, advances or prepayments by the U.S. Government, trade ac­
counts and notes payable. Federal Income Taxes accrued, install­
ments due in 1 year or less on debts, and other current liabilities. 
The data for the loan-to-deposit ratio were taken from the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, 1960-1970. The series used were as follows: 
L: Taken from the table—Loans and investments, not seasonally adjusted 
D: Taken from the table--Details of deposits and currency. Includes the 
sum of not seasonally adjusted demand deposits adjusted and not 
seasonally adjusted time deposits in commercial banks only. 
